Public authority decision makers risk thinking about accommodation in silos, through distinct statutory schemes: is the case governed by Part VII of the Housing Act 1996? The Care Act 2014? The Children Act 1989? The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999? And, most importantly for them, which department or body will therefore be paying for the accommodation?
However, individuals concerned rarely experience their circumstances in those terms. An asylum seeker with restricted mobility living in unsuitable fifth-floor accommodation, a family with no recourse to public funds facing street homelessness, and a homeless teenager being directed between housing and social services all present versions of the same problem. Shelter, care, welfare and family life do not divide neatly into statutory compartments, even if public authorities, and their budgets, want them to.
The Panel’s discussion on Accommodation Rights at Garden Court’s recent conference “Socio-Economic Rights – The Next Chapter”, hosted by King’s College London, explored the diverse sources of accommodation rights, spanning homelessness assistance, asylum support, social care and Children Act accommodation. A common question emerged: what difference might a socio-economic duty make to the way these systems operate?
Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, which is in force in Scotland and Wales, and has been voluntarily adopted by some local authorities in England, requires certain public authorities, when making strategic decisions, to have “due regard” to the desirability of exercising their functions in a way that reduces inequalities of outcome resulting from socio-economic disadvantage. Importantly, it is concerned with decision-making at a strategic level; the duty does not create a private cause of action, but is targets the way public bodies design policies, allocate resources and assess the likely consequences of their decisions.
One of the recurring features of accommodation litigation is that the legal right itself is often not the primary obstacle; the difficulty lies in accessing the systems intended to provide support. Jo Underwood’s research on local authority “closed door” policies illustrated this in the homelessness context. Her findings suggest that many London boroughs now require homeless applicants to navigate online forms, telephone systems or email processes before accessing assistance, creating particular difficulties for those experiencing digital exclusion, ill-health or communication barriers. The statutory framework under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 may impose duties towards eligible homeless applicants, but those duties provide limited protection if people struggle to access the system in the first place.
A socio-economic duty encourages public bodies to ask a different question: instead of asking whether a particular applicant ultimately meets the statutory tests, it asks whether the structure of the service disproportionately disadvantages those already experiencing poverty and exclusion. It shifts attention from individual cases to systemic outcomes.
Similar themes appeared in the discussion of Mark Rogers, from ASAP, surrounding asylum support. Issues relating to accommodation quality, subsistence rates, consultation and relocation practices demonstrate how access to support can be shaped as much by administrative systems as by formal legal rights. Although asylum support under sections 95 and 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is intended to function as a safety net, disputes frequently arise around the adequacy and practical operation of that safety net.
The same tension can be seen in community care law. Under section 18 of the Care Act 2014, local authorities are required to meet eligible needs for care and support. Section 8 expressly recognises accommodation as one way in which those needs may be met. At the same time, sections 21 and 23 draw boundaries between social care responsibilities, housing functions and immigration-related exclusions. The resulting litigation has produced the familiar concept of “accommodation-related” needs: recognition that accommodation may be necessary because care cannot realistically be delivered without it.
Cases such as R (SB & SBO) v London Borough of Newham [2023] EWHC 2701 (Admin) and R (TMX) v London Borough of Croydon (1) SSHD (2) [2024] EWHC 129 (Admin) illustrate the courts’ rejection of the existence of accommodation powers elsewhere in the statutory landscape as an automatic answer to the question of ultimate responsibility for accommodation. The focus must remain on the practical effect of unsuitable accommodation on the individual concerned.
A socio-economic duty might not alter the outcome of those individual cases. It could, however, influence the strategic decisions that produce them. When designing accommodation policies, commissioning temporary accommodation, or allocating social care resources, public authorities would be required to consider whether their decisions contribute to inequalities of outcome experienced by those who are already disadvantaged.
Much the same could be said of the Children Act 1989. Sections 17 and 20 operate as important safeguards against child destitution and homelessness. Yet many of the reported cases arise because children and families become trapped between statutory systems: between housing and children’s services, between local authority support and Home Office support, or between short-term assistance and longer-term responsibilities.
The courts have repeatedly resisted attempts to postpone support or redirect responsibility elsewhere. Although schedule 3 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 restricts support for families subject to immigration control, section 17 support remains available for children (sch 3, para 2(1)(b)) and can extend to adult family members where required, to avoid an Article 3 breach (see Birmingham City Council v Clue [2010] EWCA Civ 460 and R(GW) v Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council [2025] EWHC 2140 (Admin)). Local authorities cannot avoid or defer their responsibilities under section 17 by pointing towards the possibility of future Home Office support under section 4(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (see; R (ES) v LB Barking and Dagenham [2013] EWHC 691 (Admin). The position, however, differs where support under section 95 is available, since section 122(5) the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 restricts the local authority’s powers in relation to accommodation and essential living needs (R (VC) v Newcastle City Council [2011] EWHC 2673 (Admin) at §52-53).
Viewed through the lens of section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, these authorities highlight how administrative delay can itself contribute to unequal outcomes for those already experiencing socio-economic disadvantage.
The same concern is evident in cases involving homeless young people. Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 imposes a duty to accommodate certain children in need and acts as the gateway to looked-after status and leaving-care support. The authorities from R (G) v Southwark LBC [2008] UKHL 26 onwards reflect a longstanding judicial unease about children being passed between departments or diverted towards alternative statutory routes carrying fewer protections. The recent decision in R (FZW) v Bristol City Council [2026] EWHC 1956 (Admin) continues that line of authority. At its heart lies a familiar public law question: whether administrative convenience has begun to overshadow the purpose of the statutory scheme itself.
Decisions about whether a young person is accommodated under section 20 can have profound consequences for future housing stability, educational opportunities and access to leaving-care support. Looked at through a socio-economic lens, these are precisely the sorts of strategic decisions and institutional practices capable of entrenching, or mitigating, existing inequalities of outcome. Rather than treating accommodation as an immediate response to crisis, section 1 invites consideration of its long-term consequences for life chances and social participation.
The wellbeing principle in section 1 of the Care Act 2014 includes personal dignity, social and economic wellbeing, family relationships and the suitability of living accommodation amongst the matters to which local authorities must have regard. Accommodation appears not as an isolated concern but as part of a wider account of how individuals are able to live, participate and maintain relationships. A similar concern can be seen in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, which requires the child’s welfare to be the court’s paramount consideration and reflects a longstanding recognition that housing, care, family life, education and development cannot sensibly be separated from one another.
These perspectives fit comfortably with the ambition underlying section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, which invites public authorities to look beyond immediate statutory compliance and consider the cumulative effects of their decisions on those experiencing poverty, exclusion and disadvantage. In the context of accommodation, that might mean implementing policies which require decision makers to conduct assessments with a minimum dignity threshold in mind or examining whether digital-only access systems exclude vulnerable applicants; whether accommodation policies separate families or isolate disabled individuals; whether asylum accommodation practices exacerbate existing disadvantage; or whether gaps between statutory schemes are themselves driving unequal outcomes.
The issue with accessing accommodation is often whether public systems are organised in a way that allows individuals to access support, maintain family life, receive care and live with dignity. That is ultimately where the promise of a socio-economic duty may lie: not in creating a new right to accommodation, but in requiring public authorities to conduct assessments with an absolute dignity standard in mind and confront the ways in which existing accommodation systems can reproduce destitution, disadvantage and exclusion.
